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Market Integration, Country Institutions and 
IPO Underpricing 
 
 
Abstract 
We extend the IPO literature analysing the role of financial market integration 
in the development of IPO markets and the pricing of newly listed stocks. 
Using a hierarchical linear model, we show that differences in underpricing 
between markets with high and low financial integration levels are 
economically significant and may explain the choice of location in the listing 
process. Firstly, market integration negatively affects the level of IPO 
underpricing by increasing the importance and efficiency of the financial 
intermediation process via tradable securities. Secondly, the presence of a 
deeper market integration has a moderation effect, which weakens the 
explanatory power of country institutions in the cross-country variation of IPO 
underpricing. Finally, we suggest a hierarchical structure be assumed for the 
modelling of cross-country IPO studies with heterogeneous country 
characteristics. Our results are robust to alternative measures of financial 
integration and several model specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
Even if the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing is a well-known phenomenon 
(Loughran et al., 1994, updated in 2015), the institutional settings of a country (hereafter 
country institutions) have become less important for the decision of going public 
domestically or abroad due to the increased integration of financial markets (Doidge et al., 
2013). This is in line with the widely-accepted argument in the law and finance literature that 
the influence of country institutions in corporate decision-making decreases as increasing 
financial globalization allows firms to choose institutions of other countries.  
A growing stream of literature examines the impact of country institutions, such as 
legal frameworks, on the significant cross-country variation in IPO underpricing, after 
controlling for firm- and issuing-specific factors (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 
2010, Hopp and Dreher, 2013). More recently, Doidge et al. (2013) and Caglio et al. (2016) 
show how financial integration positively supports the development of IPO markets (number 
and size of listings) and moderates the effect of country institutions on IPO decisions. In our 
paper, we combine and extend this literature by assessing how the increasing exposure of 
local markets to global factors reduces IPO underpricing and weakens the impact that country 
institutions have on the cross-country variation in IPO underpricing. 
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to link IPO underpricing 
with financial market integration and the main contribution to the literature is threefold. 
Firstly, we argue that market integration directly increases both the importance and efficiency 
of its financial intermediation process via tradable securities (including IPO underwriting), 
which in turn negatively impacts the level of IPO underpricing. The inverse relationship 
between the efficiency of financial intermediation and the level of underpricing is extensively 
supported by empirical evidence following the information extraction theory by Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989). 1  During the financial integration process, the focus of the banking 
business shifts away from the traditional depositary business to a one more heavily relying on 
wholesale markets and financial intermediation by using tradable securities (e.g. providing 
IPO and SEO underwriting services). An investment bank’s market share of underwriting 
deals is affected by the efficiency of its previous underwriting performance, measured by the 
level of underpricing (Beaty and Ritter, 1986). Meanwhile, the market integration process 
                                                 
1  See also (Carter and Manaster, 1990, Carter et al., 1998, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Nanda and 
Youngkeol, 1997, Tinic, 1988). 
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reduces the competitive advantage of domestic banks through the presence of an increased 
number of foreign banks in domestic markets and increased opportunities to access finance in 
foreign markets. To respond to the growing role of financial intermediation, the overall 
quality of financial services is improved. This may occur through a spillover effect, where 
less competitive domestic players try to learn from foreign banks and institutions with better 
financial systems. Consequently, the efficiency of the financial intermediation process in the 
home country should improve due to its increasing level of integration with the global market. 
In line with this expectation, we find that market integration reduces IPO underpricing. 
Secondly, the law and finance literature demonstrates that a growing globalization 
weakens the role of country institutions on corporate finance activities (Doidge et al., 2007, 
Doidge et al., 2013, Kho et al., 2009, Stulz, 1999, Stulz, 2009). Following this evidence, we 
argue that financial market integration also works as a moderation effect weakening the 
explanatory power of country institutions in the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing. 
Particularly, market integration allows companies to access finance in foreign markets and to 
borrow from foreign institutions, reducing the cost of funding. In fact, we show that the 
boundaries between capital markets in different countries fade away and the impact of 
country institutions on the cross-country IPO underpricing is weakened. These results also 
help us to understand the regional conditions for foreign IPO investment opportunities. They 
provide issuers and underwriters with an insight into the economic effects of country 
institutions on IPO underpricing in a wider context of financial integration. More widely, our 
findings indicate that the process of financial market integration with the global market 
improves the efficiency on primary markets and reduces the cost of equity internationally by 
driving the convergence of institutional quality across countries.  
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, we apply hierarchical linear modelling to a 
large dataset that has a clustering structure, using a mixed-effects model. Moving away from 
a simple OLS estimation used in previous international studies, we are able to test the 
country-level effects and correct for the country clustering structure at the same time, which 
cannot be realized by a fixed effect model. Our results are also confirmed by propensity score 
matching, which reveals a 10% reduction of IPO underpricing when markets are financially 
integrated. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section summarises the literature review 
and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data collection process and 
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estimation models. Sections 4 and 5 discuss main results and robustness tests, while section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The literature on IPO underpricing is substantial and previous studies explain this 
phenomenon focusing on pre-market activities following either an information-asymmetry-
based theory, or an aftermarket demand-driven behavioural argument. 2  The first stream 
generally argues that underpricing is a consequence of the information asymmetry existing 
between the agents involved in an IPO event. The first systematic information asymmetry 
model by Rock (1986) argues that some investors have better information about the IPO 
valuation than the issuers and underwriters. Underpricing is used as a compensation for 
investors with information disadvantages who are otherwise reluctant to participate in IPOs. 
Beaty and Ritter (1986) show that uninformed investors are discouraged by the “winner’s 
curse” risk and issuers use underpricing to attract investors who believe that shares are only 
available because they are mispriced or unwanted. Finally, signalling models present 
underpricing as a strategy adopted by issuers to signal the company’s quality. In this set-up, 
only well-performing companies are able to afford the initial cost of underpricing which can 
be recovered in the subsequent season equity offerings (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, Grinblatt 
and Hwang, 1989, Welch, 1989).  
On the other hand, behavioural arguments focus on the IPO issuance process. 
Brailsford et al. (2004) document how general market conditions and investors’ sentiment 
affect IPO volumes and underpricing. The prospect theory by Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
shows that the value of investors’ holdings increases substantially after the first day of trading 
compared to the expected valuation based on the initial file range of the offer price. 
Compared with the value gain, the diluted wealth (or value loss) due to underpricing seems 
negligible and therefore, issuers accept a certain level of underpricing.3  
Finally, the presence of different institutions in the IPO process might also impact 
underpricing such as auditor’s quality (Beaty, 1989),4 status of venture capital-backing (Barry 
                                                 
2 For a very detailed review on the IPO literature, please refer to Ritter and Welch (2002). 
3  See, for example Derrien (2005), Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Reber and Vencappa (2016) for more 
behavioural arguments on IPO underpricing. 
4 Hong et al. (2014) also find that the adoption of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards has a 
negative impact on the level of IPO underpricing.  
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et al., 1990, Gompers, 1996, Lerner, 1994), ownership structure pre- and post-IPO (Brennan 
and Franks, 1997) and the role of underwriters (Beaty and Ritter, 1986, Carter and Manaster, 
1990, Carter et al., 1998, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Ellis et al., 2000, Nanda and 
Youngkeol, 1997, Tinic, 1988, Boeh and Dunbar, 2016). Moreover, although the focus in 
previous literature has been on firm- and issue-specific variables, more recent international 
studies show that country institutions are also important to explain the cross-country variation 
in IPO underpricing (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 
2013). We extend the literature by focussing on the roles of financial market integration in 
the IPO underpricing anomaly. The next two sections describe our research hypotheses. 
 
Direct effect of financial market integration on IPO underpricing 
IPOs represent complex financial deals where company information is not fully 
disclosed and the involvement of several independent institutions (i.e. issuer, investors and 
underwriters) makes the financial intermediation process highly relevant to understand the 
pricing dynamics. The information extraction theory by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
represents the most empirically supported theoretical setting. The authors argue that the 
bookbuilding process of an IPO represents the information extraction process during which 
the underwriters retrieve useful information from informed investors to set an appropriate 
offering price. Therefore, the efficiency of this information extraction process is critical to the 
level of underpricing. On one hand, acting as information producers, underwriters set 
standards to obtain an issuing company’s valuation; on the other hand, underwriters try to 
extract useful information from informed investors and compensate them with a certain level 
of underpricing. However, as both actions are unobservable, issuers choose underwriters 
according to their reputation based on past performance (i.e. success) and underpricing. 
When underwriters either overprice or heavily underprice, their subsequent market share 
decreases (Beaty and Ritter, 1986, Carter and Manaster, 1990, Carter et al., 1998, 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Nanda and Youngkeol, 1997, Tinic, 1988, Sherman, 2005). 
Hence, investment banks have incentives to improve the efficiency of the financial 
intermediation process to set an appropriate offer price.  
In particular, financial market integration impacts on the underwriting process 
because a market’s financial exposure to global factors can “increase the depth and breadth 
of domestic financial markets and lead to an increase in the degree of efficiency of the 
financial intermediation process” (Agénor, 2003). In fact, market integration significantly 
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enhances the competitiveness of the banking system through different mechanisms. Firstly, it 
increases the competition for domestic banks by raising the number of foreign banks 
operating in local markets (Caprio and Honohan, 1999) and allowing companies to access 
more affordable financing opportunities in foreign markets. As far as IPOs are concerned, 
financial integration reduces the costs and improves the likelihood of domestic companies 
going public abroad to access better institutional settings. Financial integration is found to 
increase the number of global IPOs – Doidge et al. (2013) – and to precipitate the shift of 
banks from the traditional loans and depository business, to financial intermediation based on 
securities – Hausler (2002). Furthermore, in response to the higher competition introduced by 
market integration, domestic banks learn from foreign banks and other institutions and tend to 
develop a better banking regulatory system (Caprio and Honohan, 1999). As a result, we 
expect domestic banks to become more effective information producers in the IPO process, 
improving the financial intermediation process and, according to the information extraction 
theory, leading to a lower overall level of underpricing. Finally, and strictly for IPOs, Caglio 
et al. (2016) and Doidge et al. (2013) point out that financial globalization increases the 
likelihood and reduces the cost of domestic companies going public abroad, providing 
companies with an opportunity to escape from poor institutional settings in their home 
countries – e.g. Doidge et al. (2013) find that the number of global IPOs is increased by 
world financial globalization.  
All these arguments indicate a negative relationship between the level of financial 
market integration and IPO underpricing, and therefore we form the first hypothesis as 
follows: 
 
H1: Financial market integration decreases the cost of listing as measured by IPO 
underpricing. 
 
Moderation effect of financial market integration on IPO underpricing 
Alongside a direct relationship between financial market integration and IPO 
underpricing, we also test the existence of an indirect mechanism. Previous cross-country 
studies document that country-level institutional settings can affect IPO activities and add to 
the explanation of underpricing. Particularly, legal settings, such as the protection for 
investors, law enforcement, rule of law quality, corruption level and legal origin of a country, 
are found to significantly affect the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPO valuation in a similar way 
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as firm- and issue-level characteristics do (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, 
Hopp and Dreher, 2013). 
However, a rise in the level of financial integration weakens the influence of country 
institutions on corporate finance activities. Generally, this argument arises from the fact that 
financial integration allows a greater flexibility as companies can use foreign markets to 
choose the most suitable country institutions to be subjected to. A strong but also implicitly 
reasonable argument is made by Stulz (2009): “in a fully integrated world, we would expect 
national capital markets to be irrelevant”. He argues that the advantages of country 
institutions for domestic firms gradually disappear, with financial market integration allowing 
firms to choose better institutions in a foreign market and lowering the costs of international 
investments and capital raising (Stulz, 1999, Stulz, 2009). La Porta et al. (2006) show that the 
influence and effectiveness of laws regulating the issuance and trading of securities in a 
country are heavily linked to the development of the underlying financial market. However, 
the impact of such laws is weakened in more open capital markets where firms can freely 
choose to subject themselves to the laws of other countries. Similarly, Kho et al. (2009) find 
increasing financial market integration decreases the importance of country institutions on 
corporate finance and governance activities over time. Particularly, Doidge et al. (2007) 
argue that the impact of country institutions on IPO activities are weakened by more 
accessible global capital markets, while Doidge et al. (2013) show that world financial 
integration increases the number of global IPOs and weakens the effects of country 
institutions on the number and size of both domestic and global IPOs. Therefore, they argue 
that financial globalization plays a weakening role for country institutions for IPO activities.  
Following this line of research, we extend the literature by examining the role of 
financial integration as a moderation effect that weakens the role of country institutions in 
explaining the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
is formulated as follows: 
 
H2: Financial market integration weakens the impact of a country’s institutions on IPO 
underpricing.  
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3. Data and methodology 
Sample and variables 
Data on worldwide IPOs from January 1995 to December 2017 is collected from 
Thomson ONE New Issues Database, while market-level data is sourced from Thomson 
Reuters DataStream Professional. We obtain IPO information on both offering and first-
trading-day closing price to measure the level of IPO underpricing. In line with previous 
studies, we initially exclude companies in the finance, insurance and real estate industries 
(SIC code between 60 and 67) and companies with missing observations. From a total of 
14,587 deals, we apply a filtering process to obtain a final full sample of 12,778 IPOs from 
37 countries by removing: IPOs with abnormal initial returns outside the −67% to +2,000% 
range (likely due to measurement errors);5 IPOs using a private placement; IPOs in countries 
recognised as tax-haven non-sovereign jurisdictions (e.g. Bermuda and British Virgin 
Islands); outliers of initial returns in the top and bottom 1% percentiles; and deals in countries 
with less than 5 IPOs during the overall sample period. 
The level of IPO underpricing is the dependent variable in our study and is measured 
by the initial return on the first day of trading as follows:  
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡-𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  ((1) 
 
As the market return is negligible compared to the level of underpricing, we do not 
adjust for it, in line with most of the previous empirical studies. 
The main variable of interest in our study is the level of financial market integration 
of the country where the company is listed for the first time. As an IPO represents an 
important event in the stock market and is heavily influenced by stock market conditions, we 
focus on the actual integration of the stock market among other possible measures of 
globalization and integration. To measure financial market integration, we follow the method 
developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) and compute the actual market integration by 
focusing on the explanatory power of a multi-factor model on global market factors. The R-
squared of such a multi-factor model represents the country’s level of financial market 
integration with global markets. Rather than using correlations, this measure captures the 
                                                 
5 This selection criterion is used by Banerjee et al. (2011). 
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extent to which market returns are explained by global and domestic factors. In addition, as 
this measure is based on daily returns, we are able to capture the time-variance within 
countries for the entire sample period, without relying on secondary sources as is for the other 
four alternative measures we use in our robustness checks. We also further separate financial 
integration from overall market development by controlling for market returns and turnover, 
which also show a low level of correlation with our financial integration measure.  
The impact of market integration on IPO underpricing is tested after controlling for 
firm- and issuing-level characteristics. In particular, IPO size (LSIZE) is used to proxy for the 
ex-ante uncertainty about the issuing company, as proposed by Beaty and Ritter (1986), and 
some dummy variables capture whether the IPO is venture capital-backed (VB) and/or uses a 
bookbuilding method (BB), both factors reducing underpricing through a process of 
information revelation. Secondly, we control for market-related variables. According to 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006), the market return represents the 
market sentiment and is positively related to underpricing. We include the three-month 
cumulative market return (MRETURN) before the IPO issuing date and expect a positive 
relationship with underpricing. We also control for cyclical patterns in the IPO market. 
Particularly, we define the volume variable (VOLUME) as the ratio between the number of 
IPOs in a specific year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs in that country 
during the overall sample period6. A negative relationship between the IPO underpricing and 
IPO volume in the market is recorded by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Lowry and Schwert 
(2004) and Shi et al. (2013). We also include the market turnover (TURNOVER) to further 
control for market development. The data is collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream for 
each country.  
While earlier studies report a negative effect of underwriter’s reputation on IPO 
underpricing, this relationship is reversed in more recent studies. Nonetheless, the 
underwriters play an undeniably important role in IPO events. Following Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) and Shi et al. (2013), we measure the quality of underwriters by their shares in 
the IPO market and create a global underwriter reputation proxy (UNDERWRITER), taking 
the total proceeds underwritten by each underwriter as a share of the total proceeds raised 
across our sample period.  
                                                 
6 This variable is calculated based on the IPOs recorded in the database before we apply any of the filtering 
criteria. 
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To test the second hypothesis, we include five alternative country-level institutional 
variables based on previous empirical studies (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, 
Hopp and Dreher, 2013). They vary across countries but not across time.7 Particularly, we 
exclude the level of disclosure because the variable is computed using a survey in 2000 and it 
does not cover all countries in our study. Its use would require us to drop 25% of our sample, 
with particular emphasis on markets that are generally less financially integrated. Moreover, 
the use of a time-invariant measure does not reflect the changing nature of disclosure 
regulation, especially in developing and emerging markets, which represent a significant 
component of our study. The five country-level institutional variables are described below.  
The Investor Protection Index (IPI) measures the level of minority investor protection 
and has a negative impact on underpricing (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010). 
In countries where minority investors are not sufficiently protected, they tend to have less 
monitoring power over managers and big institutional investors, and they suffer from 
inappropriate managerial activities (e.g. self-dealing activities). In IPO events, the high 
uncertainty around a company valuation makes investors reluctant to participate, as they 
might become minority investors. As a result, higher underpricing is required to attract them. 
Unlike Banerjee et al. (2011) and Engelen and Essen (2010), who use the anti-self-dealing 
index constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) to capture the level of minority investor protection, 
we use the Investor Protection Index (IPI), the most recent data on the level of minority 
investor protection, reported as part of the Doing Business project by the World Bank. The 
data is collected from the related website8 and ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values 
represent a better protection for minority investors. 
By dividing a country’s law system into “law in books” (written laws) and “law in 
action” (the effectiveness of legal enforcement), Engelen and Essen (2010) find that when the 
“law in books” is relatively weak to protect investors from controlling insiders and unjust 
deals, strong legal enforcement (i.e. effective police force or courts) can to some extent 
compensate the weak investor protection. We obtain the Public Enforcement Index (PEI) as a 
proxy for the effectiveness of the legal enforcement system from La Porta’s website.9 The 
index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more effective legal enforcement. 
                                                 
7 This is a standard approach in the literature, also considering that there is very little (and insignificant) time-
variation. 
8 Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/  
9 Source: http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/rafael-laporta/research-publications/  
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Furthermore, we also include the Rule of Law Index (RLI) and the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) to proxy for the overall quality of a country’s legal system (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010). The Rule of Law Index is constructed by the World Justice Project10 and 
ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values representing better overall legal systems. The 
Corruption Perception Index is provided by Transparency International11 and measures the 
level of corruption, ranging from 0 (most corrupted environment) to 100 (least corrupted 
environment). 
Finally, ENGLISH represents a dummy variable that captures the status of a country’s 
legal origin. It equals 1 if its legal system is originated from English Common Law and 0 
otherwise. The data on legal origin is collected from La Porta et al. (1998). La Porta et al. 
(1998) find that the legal protection is generally better in common law countries (i.e. USA 
and UK) than in civil law countries (i.e. Germany, France and Scandinavian countries). 
Hence, following the literature, we expect a lower level of underpricing in countries with an 
English Common Law system.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 defines the main variables in our study and shows data sources and summary 
statistics. We report a high level of underpricing, on average 27.46%, associated with a 
significant standard deviation of 49.40%. This shows the significance of the phenomena and 
the high level of variation over time and across companies and countries. In light of the high 
variation, it will be important to control for several cross-sectional and time effects. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ] 
 
Table 2 summarizes the average IPO underpricing at country level from 1995 to 2017. 
We notice a large variation in the level of underpricing and the number of IPOs across 
countries. In our sample, the US has the highest number of observations with 3,955 IPOs, 
followed by China and Australia with 2,729 and 960 respectively. Our dataset is by far the 
                                                 
10 For more details about how the rule of law index is constructed, please refer to the World Justice Project 
website. http://worldjusticeproject.org/ 
11 Transparency International is an independent organisation that monitors the level of corruption in the world. 
Regarding the construction of the corruption perception index, please refer to their website. 
https://www.transparency.org/ 
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largest in cross-country IPO studies.12 During the sample period, all 37 countries experience 
underpricing. China has the highest level at 43.11%, with Hong Kong following at 42.77%, 
while Norway records the lowest figure at 2.33% based on 62 IPOs. Brazil shows an average 
underpricing of 5.62%, which differs from 33.1% in Loughran et al. (1994, updated 2015). 
We explain this difference arguing that our 1995 to 2017 sample period is much more recent 
than their 1979 to 2011 period. Moreover, a recent study by Minardi et al. (2015) reports a 
4.5% average underpricing for Brazilian IPOs using a similar sample period to ours (2004 to 
2012). Therefore, we believe our sample not affect the main findings of this study.13  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
 
In our second hypothesis, we test the moderation effect that financial market 
integration plays on the relationship between country institutions and underpricing. Table 3 
Panel A presents the average level of market integration and alternative measures by country. 
Our variable of interest, market integration (MI), presents similar values to those in 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Examples of markets with low levels of financial integration 
are Argentina, China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, while Australia, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, UK and US are among markets with high financial integration. 
Table 3 Panel B presents the variables used to proxy for different country-level 
institutional settings. Firstly, the correlation of different proxies is encouraging as it shows 
similar patterns across countries. The Investor Protection Index finds financially dominated 
countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore among the highest ranked, while countries such 
as the Philippines and China are among the worst in protecting investors’ interests. To our 
surprise, Luxembourg shows a low protection and the US, Germany and Sweden are only 
positioned around the average (even if still ranked above many other countries we would 
expect to have a lower protection). We find an explanation for this puzzle in the next index, 
which measures the effectiveness of legal enforcement. In fact, the aforementioned countries 
show the highest value of enforcement, alongside Canada, Sweden and others. The US 
however, still remains a puzzle, but it is solved when the characteristics of the overall legal 
                                                 
12 The ranking of the underpricing by country is highly correlated (0.6) with the one reported in Jay Ritter’s 
website, but single average figures show some differences due to the use of different sample periods. Most Jay 
Ritter’s country IPO data goes back to the 1970s, while ours starts in the 1990s. The representativeness of our 
sample is also confirmed by the high correlation (0.7) of our underpricing figures with  Banerjee et al. (2011). 
13 As robustness check, we have run the models excluding IPOs from Brazil and the results do not change.  
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system are considered (Rule of Law Index). In fact, the US is ranked top with other more 
efficient markets such as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Scandinavian 
countries and the UK. Similar results are also found for the Corruption Perception Index, 
which shows a very high correlation (0.97) with the Rule of Law Index. Finally, we find that 
34% of the countries in our study are based on the English Common Law. 
 
Hierarchical linear modelling  
An OLS estimation is a commonly adopted method in IPO literature. Since our data 
clearly shows a hierarchical structure with IPOs nesting within the same country sharing 
similar patterns, hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) – Raudenbush and Bryk (1992) – 
allows us to test our hypotheses on country institutions and control for country effects at the 
same time, without violating the independence assumption of residuals. This methodology is 
also used in the cross-country IPO underpricing study by Engelen and Essen (2010). As 
Garson (2013) points out, in the presence of a nesting or clustering structure, observations 
from the same group are not independent and the standard errors of the predicted parameters 
by an OLS regression are underestimated. As a result, wrong or imprecise inferences might 
be made. 
Particularly, we use a two-level HLM, where levels 1 and 2 represent respectively 
individual IPOs and countries (treated as a random sample from a wider population). As a 
rule of thumb, a good HLM estimation needs at least 20 observations at level 2, and our 
dataset meets this requirement with 37 countries included. Among the different specifications 
of an HLM, we use a random intercept model, which allows for the level 1 intercept to shift 
between countries (i.e. the random factor is the country variable where correlated errors are 
created and slopes are parallel lines between countries14). In the random intercept model, the 
intercept of the IPO performance at level 1 is then modelled as a random effect of the relative 
country at level 2. The specification for hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
 
 𝑯𝟏:     𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  ((2) 
 
                                                 
14 The other model is the random slope model, which allows the slope to differ across countries too. In order to 
choose between these two models, we use a likelihood ratio test and the random intercept model is more 
appropriate.  
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where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the underpricing level for IPO 𝑖 in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡; 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 is 
the level of financial integration for country 𝑗 in year 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a vector of the control 
variables; 𝜇𝑗 is the random country effect shifting the regression line between countries; and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the overall error term at level 1.15 
Alongside an HLM estimation, we also present the OLS results with random country 
effects, which generally support our main findings. Finally, to test that IPO underpricing is 
indeed affected by market integration rather than other unobserved factors or self-selection of 
companies in stock exchanges with high versus low market integration, we employ a 
treatment effect estimation with propensity score matching. We categorize IPOs into a high-
integration group if the listing country of this IPO has an above-average market integration in 
the issuing year and a low-integration group otherwise. The dummy variable of high versus 
low integration acts as a “treatment” effect, where each IPO in the high-integration group is 
matched to an IPO in the low-integration group whose propensity score is closest. In our 
estimation, the propensity score is obtained by using a logit model on VB, BB, LSIZE, 
VOLUME, MRETURN, TURNOVER and UNDERWRITER. 
 
Along with the presence of a direct effect, we also argue that financial market 
integration of a country works as a moderation effect, which weakens the explanatory power 
of the country institutions in the cross–country variation of IPO underpricing. As mentioned 
in the data section above, we include five different country-level institutional variables. In 
order to test for the moderation effect, we follow the method used in Doidge et al. (2013). 
The interaction term between financial integration and each of the five institutional variables 
is adopted to capture that effect. As Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest, the specification 
should also include the two main effects in the interaction term. Our specification is as 
follows:  
 
 𝑯𝟐:      𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑀𝐼𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ((3) 
 
                                                 
15 Note that the random effect μj and the overall error term ϵijt are independent of each other. 
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where 𝐼𝐽 is the institutional variable for country 𝑗16; the variable of interest,  (𝑀𝐼𝑗𝑡 ∗𝐼𝑗), is the interaction term between the level of market integration of country j and the 
country j institutional variable. All other variables are the same as in Equation (3). 
We start with a two-level null model to partition the variance in level 1 and level 2. 
For parsimonious reasons, and also considering that the model is simple, we do not report the 
intermediate results. The between-country variance is 111.12 and the level 1 variance is 
2319.56. Therefore, the between-country differences could explain about 5% of the variance 
in the cross-country IPO underpricing.  
 
4. Main results 
Tests on the direct effect of financial market integration  
Table 4 reports the main results for hypothesis 1, the direct effect of financial 
integration on IPO underpricing. We focus our discussion on the coefficients reported in 
Model (1), which reports the baseline model using the main proxy for the level of financial 
market integration. To make the results comparable, Market Integration (MI) used in the 
regressions are presented in percentages. Consistent with our expectation, we find that market 
integration reduces the level of IPO underpricing, improving the valuation certainty through a 
more efficient intermediation process. It also supports the argument in the law and finance 
literature that the cost of external financing caused by information asymmetry and agency 
costs is reduced by increasing financial globalization (Stulz, 1999). A one standard deviation 
increase in MI results in 0.28 standard deviation decrease in the level of IPO underpricing. A 
coefficient of −0.358 suggests that a 2.8% increase in MI translates into a 1% decrease in the 
level of underpricing, all else equal. This finding represents the first major contribution of our 
study to the literature on international IPO studies. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ] 
 
Consistent with most of the previous empirical findings, firm- and issuing-level 
control variables generally show the expected signs. Many of the early studies based on the 
                                                 
16 All country-level institutional variables are held constant throughout the sample period for each country, 
which is a common approach in the literature. 
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US market find a negative relationship between the venture-capital status and the level of 
underpricing, supporting the certification role of venture capitalists proposed by Megginson 
and Weiss (1991). They argue that the existence of venture capitalists in an IPO company 
certifies the “quality” of the IPO offer price – i.e. the price reveals all the relevant 
information and this leads to a reduction in the underpricing. However, the reversed 
relationship has also been documented (Boeh and Dunbar, 2016, Guo et al., 2006, Liu and 
Ritter, 2011), supporting the analyst lust theory by Liu and Ritter (2011). They point out that, 
as venture capitalists are more interested in the market price on the day shares are distributed 
to the limited shareholders (usually after the lock-up periods), they have a great desire to 
attract the all-star analysts’ coverage. This can affect the IPO price leading to a higher 
underpricing. We find support for the analyst lust theory, as we record a positive effect of the 
venture-capital status on the level of underpricing.  
Bookbuilding status and company size are commonly used measures for the ex-ante 
uncertainty about the valuation because the bookbuilding technique and big companies are 
normally associated with lower levels of information asymmetry. We show a negative impact 
of the bookbuilding technique and company size on IPO underpricing which is consistent 
with the majority of the empirical studies supporting the classic information-asymmetry-
based theories (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989, Beaty and Ritter, 1986, Rock, 1986, Reber and 
Vencappa, 2016). 
We report a 0.4% reduction in IPO underpricing for each percentage point of 
cumulative market return increase during the three months prior to the deal (MRETURN) in 
support of the “hot issue” period argument by Ritter (1984). This finding also provides 
evidence for the behavioural argument that a higher pre-IPO market return indicates higher 
sentiment demand from exuberant investors leading to higher initial returns (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002, Ljungqvist et al., 2006, Reber and Vencappa, 2016).  
Consistent with Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Shi et al. 
(2013), we find that IPOs issued in years with relative higher VOLUME of IPO deals 
experience lower underpricing. This result also supports the information revelation argument 
by Altı (2005), who identifies an unknown common factor driving IPO valuations. The 
private information about the common factor is gradually revealed by the outcomes of 
previous IPOs because the IPO offer price incorporates the indications of the participating 
investors’ interests. 
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The coefficient on UNDERWRITER is significantly positive, suggesting that a higher 
reputation increases the underpricing, as found in several recent studies. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ] 
 
Furthermore, we compare the HLM estimates with simple OLS estimates. Results are 
presented in Model (1) in Table 5. According to Garson (2013), even though the second level 
random factor should have no effects on the means of individual observations in the first 
level, it can change the covariance structure, hence leading to inefficient estimates by 
reducing standard errors. We find that the OLS results confirm the ones obtained using HLM, 
except for an underestimation of the impact of financial integration on underpricing by circa 
35%. The differences in our results are due to the random factors at level 2, which are not 
explicitly modelled in the OLS estimation. We also test for model preference using a 
likelihood ratio, which indicates that the HLM accounting for the country random effect is 
the preferred model. Notwithstanding the normal use of simple OLS models in international 
IPO studies, we find overall confirmation that an HLM structure should be adopted to 
research a micro-level phenomenon (underpricing) using a macroeconomic country-level 
argument. This finding represents one of the major contributions of our study. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ] 
 
The final step to test the direct impact of market integration on IPO underpricing is to 
estimate a propensity score matching (PSM) model. Table 6 shows that the overall benefit of 
listing a company in a highly integrated market corresponds to a 10% reduction in IPO 
underpricing – Model (1). Our PSM results are consistent with HLM and OLS estimations. 
 
Tests on the moderation effect of financial market integration 
The baseline results for hypothesis 2, the indirect effect of financial integration, are 
presented in Table 7. Models (1) to (5) each include a different proxy of the country-level 
institutional variables. Overall, the inclusion of country institutions in our models does not 
alter the significant negative impact of financial integration on IPO underpricing. At the same 
time, we find that a better legal protection of minority investors (IPI) and quality of legal 
framework (RLI), more effective public enforcement (PEI), a lower level of corruption (CPI) 
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and the existence of an English common law-based system (ENGLISH) in a country reduce 
the uncertainty of the ex-ante IPO valuation as well as the level of underpricing. This is 
consistent with previous cross-country IPO studies.  
However, the significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term (MI x Institution) 
signals that market integration acts as a moderator effect, reducing the extent to which 
country institutions affect the level of IPO underpricing. In other words, in a country that is 
more financially integrated with the global markets, institutional characteristics show a 
weaker effect on the IPO underpricing. This finding supports our second hypothesis and the 
argument in the law and finance literature that financial globalization weakens country 
institutions. It is also consistent with Doidge et al. (2013), who find that the world financial 
globalization reduces the impact of country institutions on IPO size and numbers. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ] 
 
This is particularly evident in Model (1), where the negative relationship between the 
level of minority investor protection (IPI) and the level of IPO underpricing is consistent with 
Banerjee et al. (2011), Engelen and Essen (2010) and Hopp and Dreher (2013). They all 
argue that more underpricing is required to compensate the minority investors in a country 
where the investor’s protection is insufficient. We show that this effect is weakened by the 
improvements in the level of financial integration. Models (2), (3), (4) and (5) also show a 
reduction in the direct negative relationship between underpricing and the level of Public 
Enforcement Index (PEI), the Rule of Law Index (RLI), the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) and the English common law dummy (ENGLISH) due to higher levels of market 
integration. Finally, the coefficients of all control variables are still consistent with the 
baseline Model (1) reported in Table 4. 
The interpretation of the interaction term between continuous variables is not as 
straightforward as the one between categorical variables. For example, in Model (5) the high 
absolute value of ENGLISH indicates that the average IPO underpricing in English common 
law countries is 23% lower than elsewhere. However, the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term indicates that this prominent impact is somewhat weakened by the increase 
in the level of financial integration. When the level of market integration increases by 1%, the 
decrease in the average underpricing caused by the English common law system is reduced 
by 0.28%.  
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Since market integration and institutional variables are both continuous variables in 
Models (1) to (4) we also estimate the second hypothesis by re-centring market integration at 
one standard deviation below (4a) or above (4b) its mean as follows: 
 
 𝑀𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤 = 𝑀𝐼 − (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝐼 − 1𝑠𝑑) ((4a) 
 𝑀𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝑀𝐼 − (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝐼 + 1𝑠𝑑). ((4b) 
 
This procedure allows us to hold the market integration constant at “low” – MI_Low 
in Equation (4a) – and “high” – MI_High in Equation (4b) – values and to compute the slopes 
of the country institutional variables under these two scenarios.  
With market integration assuming a value of zero, 𝛽2 in Equation (3) represents the 
impact of country institutions (I) on IPO underpricing. However, the level of market 
integration is unlikely to reach a value of zero or below. Hence, by subtracting (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝐼 −1𝑠𝑑)  or (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀𝐼 + 1𝑠𝑑)  from MI, a value of zero for the newly constructed market 
integration measure is made meaningful. For example, 𝑀𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤  (𝑀𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) can take the 
value of zero when market integration is held constant at one standard deviation below 
(above) its mean (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 − 1𝑠𝑑) ((𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 + 1𝑠𝑑)). The interpretation of 𝛽2  becomes 
straightforward as it simply represents the effect of country institutions on the level of 
underpricing, given a constant low (high) level of financial integration – one standard 
deviation below (above) the mean. Therefore, comparing the slopes on country institutional 
variables when market integration moves from low to high values, we expect the slope to 
flatten (i.e. the absolute value of the 𝛽2 coefficient to decrease). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE ] 
 
Estimated coefficients are reported in Table 8. Models (1) to (4) present estimations 
for four different country institutions respectively: IPI, PEI, RLI and CPI. Under each model, 
we report two equations for market integration held at low (a) or high (b) values respectively. 
Interaction_Low and Interaction_High are the interaction terms between each of the country 
institutions and MI_Low and MI_High respectively. As all estimates of control variables 
remain similar to our baseline results in Table 7, we do not report them here. As expected, 
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Model (1) shows that the absolute value of the coefficient for IPI decreases when market 
integration moves from low (Model (1a)) to high (Model (1b)) values. More specifically, a 
one unit increase in the level of investors’ protection results in an 10.44% decrease in average 
underpricing when market integration is held at one standard deviation below its mean, while 
the decrease is reduced to 5.15% when market integration is increased by two standard 
deviations (one standard deviation above its mean). The same pattern is found on the 
remaining country institutional variables. Interestingly, we find that, for some country 
institutions, market integration not only decreases the impact on IPO underpricing, but also 
changes the direction of the impact. One possible explanation is that countries with good-
quality institutions might be “punished” by integrating deeply with global markets, which 
have on average lower quality institutions than theirs. This is in line with the argument that 
developing countries benefit more from the globalization process than developed countries. 
Overall, the empirical results reported in Table 8 further support our second hypothesis and 
reinforce the evidence of the moderation effect of market integration. Further robustness tests 
are reported in the next section. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
To test that our results are not driven by the choice of a specific financial integration 
measure, we also use alternative measures to estimate models for hypothesis 1. Firstly, we 
employ the KOF Index of Globalization17 and, similar to Doidge et al. (2013), we focus on 
one of its Economic Globalization Index (EG). This measure is constructed using an equally 
weighted combination of the de facto (EG_df) and de jure (EG_dj) measures of Economic 
Globalization. We use these two indices separately. A sub-index in EG measures the financial 
market integration, which is closer to our market integration measure. Therefore, we also 
include the de facto (Finance_df) and de jure (Finance_dj) measures of financial integration 
separately. Finance_df is the sum of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, a 
method firstly developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and revised in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). Finance_dj measures the country’s capital account openness based on its 
restrictions on the cross-border financial transactions, a metric developed by Chinn and Ito 
                                                 
17 The KOF index is constructed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute and is updated annually. The overall 
index consists of 36% economic globalization, 37% social globalization and 27% political globalization. The 
data and details on the index construction are available on the website: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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(2006). Results reported in Models (2) to (4) in Table 4 are very similar to the original 
baseline results in Model (1). A 1% increase in EG_df (EG_dj) results in a 0.33% (0.5%) 
decrease in the level of IPO underpricing. This impact increases to 0.45% and 0.5% in 
Models (4) and (5), indicating that financial market integration seems to have a stronger 
impact than the overall economic globalization. On the whole, we confirm the significant 
effects of the financial integration on IPO underpricing.  
We also use all these alternative proxies in our OLS estimation, reporting results in 
Models (2) to (5) within Table 5. They further confirm our main findings. Furthermore, we 
employ the four alternative proxies of financial integration in the propensity score matching 
(PSM) estimation and present findings in Table 6. Our PSM results in Models (2) to (5) are 
consistent with HLM and OLS estimations and show robustness to the use of alternative 
proxies of financial integration. 
In the main result section, we strengthen the inference of our second hypothesis 
(moderator effect) by holding the market integration constant at high and low levels (see 
Table 8). We further test the robustness of our results replacing our main measure of market 
integration with the Economic Globalization Index (EG) in Table 9. The coefficients for EG, 
country institutions, interaction terms and control variables are all similar to the baseline 
results presented in Table 7. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE ] 
 
Furthermore, a general concern linked to the inclusion of an interaction term is the 
increased multicollinearity, which might affect the precision of our inference. To test for the 
impact of increased collinearity on our estimation, we follow Aiken and West (1991) and 
Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) and mean-centre the two variables before interacting them as 
follows: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝑀𝐼 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝑀𝐼) ∗ (𝐼 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼) ((5) 
 
where 𝑀𝐼  is the level of market integration; 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝑀𝐼  is its mean across all 
observations; 𝐼 represents a country-level institutional variable and 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼 is its mean across 
countries. Results are presented in Table 10, where Models (1) to (5) refer to different proxies 
for country institutions as in Table 7. All models show that, although the centred variables 
  
22  
have different values of coefficient estimates, their effect and significance do not change, 
signalling that our results are not driven by a potential increased collinearity induced by the 
interaction term.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE ] 
 
Furthermore, we have operated several other robustness tests, the results of which are 
not fully reported in this paper for parsimonious reasons. Overall, our main findings 
withstand all following extra robustness tests.  
Firstly, our findings are robust to the introduction of year dummies by using both 
HLM and OLS estimations, with coefficients showing values and statistical significance in 
line with the main models. To further support the results by HLM, we have also estimated 
OLS models with clustering by country and year respectively and the main findings remain 
consistent. 
Secondly, we confirm that financial market integration reduces IPO underpricing not 
only for foreign IPOs but also domestic ones. We exclude all foreign IPOs and estimate the 
main model (with both HLM and OLS) using a reduced sample of domestic IPOs only and 
find no significant differences in our results. As an alternative strategy, we also interact a 
foreign IPO dummy variable with market integration and find confirmation for all main 
results on financial integration, country institutions and their interactions. While most of the 
specifications have returned insignificant coefficients of the interaction term between market 
integration and the foreign IPO dummy, some suggest that foreign IPOs might experience 
greater impact from market integration. In other words, while both domestic and foreign IPOs 
experience a decrease in underpricing when market integration increases, the scale of this 
decrease is greater for foreign IPOs than for domestic ones. Both tests strengthen the findings 
and eliminate the concerns that financial market integration of a country only impacts on 
foreign IPOs.  
Thirdly, to test that our results are not driven by the US market – the most popular 
destination for foreign listings – we exclude all US IPOs and estimate HLM models on the 
remaining 36 countries. All main findings are statistically and economically consistent for 
both hypotheses. More particularly, with a negative coefficient for venture capital status (VB), 
in countries other than the US we find support for the certification argument by Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) rather than analyst lust theory by Liu and Ritter (2011). Meanwhile, the 
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coefficient on underwriters’ reputation (UNDERWRITER) becomes insignificant, suggesting 
that underwriters’ reputation is primarily important in the US. This finding related to the 
‘dark side’ of financial institutions is worth exploring further.  
Fourthly, to address potential correlated omitted variables, we estimate a model 
specification adding two country-level control variables to the baseline specification of our 
second hypothesis included in Table 7. In particular, we first separately and then jointly add 
trade openness and home bias, which may be correlated with market integration, country 
institutions and IPO underpricing. Coefficient estimates show that market integration, country 
institutions and the interaction term are still statistically and economically significant. This 
estimation procedure is applied for each institutional variable used in Table 7 and results are 
consistent. 
Finally, although the average underpricing of Brazil in our sample is similar to more 
recent studies, it still might raise concerns as it is significantly smaller than what is reported 
on Jay Ritter’s website, as mentioned earlier. We then estimate models excluding Brazilian 
IPOs and results still hold. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 By using a hierarchical linear modelling with nearly 13,000 IPOs from 37 countries, 
this study presents evidence that IPO underpricing decreases when the IPO listing market is 
more integrated with the global markets. In particular, we argue that a direct effect is firstly 
obtained through an improved efficiency of the financial intermediation process because of 
the increased external competition introduced by financial integration, which eventually 
improves the efficiency of IPO pricing for both domestic and foreign IPOs. Therefore, this 
effect could have two possible explanations. Firstly, companies going public domestically 
benefit from a higher competition in the home market, which decreases the information 
asymmetry and makes the pricing process more transparent. Secondly, foreign IPOs may 
benefit from listing in countries with an improved efficiency. Importantly, we find that this 
relationship is robust to the use of either de jure or de facto measures of financial integration 
and it does not represent a cyclical phenomenon that is restricted to a specific period.  
Moreover, we identify an indirect channel where market integration reduces IPO 
underpricing by diminishing the role country institutions play in the development of financial 
markets. Once integration is accounted for, we find that the impact of country institutions on 
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IPO underpricing weakens. This can be explained by companies becoming less reliant on 
home institutions due to the increased accessibility to the global markets. Hence, we argue 
that the integration of financial markets has a moderation effect, reducing the explanatory 
power of country institutions in IPO underpricing.  
Overall, our empirical findings support the previous literature in international 
corporate finance, providing complementary evidence that market integration not only lowers 
the cost of external financing, but also weakens the role of country institutions on corporate 
finance decisions – e.g. Stulz (1999, 2009) and Doidge et al. (2013). By identifying the 
effects of financial integration, this work adds to the explanation of IPO underpricing 
(especially cross-country variation), and also presents a macroeconomic approach to 
investigate corporate finance activities.   
Our findings provide issuers, underwriters and investors some insights into the role 
that country institutional settings play in IPO markets and how this role can be altered by 
improvements in market integration. Firstly, as financial integration decreases the cost of 
IPOs associated with underpricing and increases the capital that the issuing company can 
raise, it gives issuers incentives to seek more financially integrated markets for listings. 
Secondly, the dynamic relationship between market integration, country institutions and IPO 
performance is particularly informative for foreign IPO investors and issuers who consider 
cross-border listings to either avoid or take advantage of certain institutional characteristics. 
Thirdly, as emerging markets are more sensitive to the globalization process, this provides 
valuable implications for policy makers regarding the impact of market integration on 
domestic financial development as well as corporate activities. While financial integration 
helps to improve the efficiency of the domestic market, it also provides domestic companies 
with opportunities to choose foreign capital by reducing constraints from institutional settings, 
e.g. legal frameworks. Therefore, a sustainable development would be linked to an 
improvement in the institutional settings and legal framework while taking advantage of the 
integration process. 
Finally, we envisage the scope of this work to develop in two main directions. First, 
as we argue that the direct effect is transmitted through the financial intermediation process, 
one could further test this mechanism by examining how the gross spread and market share of 
investment banks are affected. Second, as this work uses a static cross-sectional measure of 
legal systems, the impact and role of the dynamic development of legal systems and its 
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interaction with improvements in financial market integration may be tested in relation to the 
valuation of IPOs. 
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Table 1: Variables description and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description 
Statistics 
Obs Mean StD Min Max 
       
IR 
Initial Return (%), which measures the level of underpricing as the difference 
between the offer price and the closing price on the first trading day. Source: 
Thomson One 
12778 27.46 49.40 -58.33 890.00 
VB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital backed; 0 otherwise. Source: Thomson One 12735 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
BB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO method is bookbuilding; 0 otherwise. Source: Thomson One 12125 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 
LSIZE Frim size: natural log of the total proceeds of the IPOs. Source: Thomson One 12778 3.40 1.73 -6.91 9.99 
VOLUME 
IPO volume: for each country-year companion, it is the number of IPOs in a given 
year in this country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period 
in this country, expressed in 100%. Source: Thomson One. 
12778 9.71 6.96 0.10 100.00 
MRETURN Market return: 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, based on the market index in DataStream. Source: DataStream 12778 3.82 9.61 -40.46 80.16 
TURNOVER Stock market turnover: annual turnover by value in the year of IPO. Source: DataStream 12471 981.54 630.41 4.17 4481 
UNDERWRITER 
Global underwriter reputation: this is a widely-used measure of underwriters' 
reputation following Megginson and Weiss (1991). Following Shi et al (2013), we 
use the total proceeds underwritten by each lead underwriter as a share of the total 
proceeds during our sample period. Source: Thomson One 
12364 1.22 2.43 0.00 8.99 
MI 
Market Integration: a measure of the actual market integration of one country with the 
global markets by identifying the explanatory power of a multi-factor model on 
global factors. R-squared is then used as an indicator of market integration. This 
method is developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) with high frequency data. 
For comparison purpose, it is presented in percentage levels in the estimations. 
Source: DataStream 
12363 68.24 37.84 2.25 99.97 
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Table 1: Variables description and descriptive statistics (continued) 
Variable Description 
Statistics 
Obs Mean StD Min Max 
IPI  
Investor Protection Index: measures the level of legal protection of minority 
investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing 
better protection. For each company, the IPI of the country where it is firstly listed 
has been included. This data is directly collected from the website of the Doing 
Business project by the World Bank. 
12778 6.25 1.09 4.20 8.20 
PEI 
Public Enforcement Index: measures the effectiveness of one country's legal 
enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values 
representing more effective legal enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008). For each 
company, the PEI of the country where it is firstly listed has been included. This 
data is directly collected from Rafael La Porta’s website. 
12771 0.17 0.33 0.00 1.00 
RLI 
Rule of Law Index: measures the overall quality of the legal framework, with higher 
values representing better legal system. This data is constructed by the World Justice 
Project and collected from their website. For each company, the RLI of the country 
where it is firstly listed has been included.  
11905 0.66 0.13 0.45 0.88 
CPI 
Corruption Perception Index: measures the level of the overall corruption, with 0 
representing the most corrupted system. This data is constructed by the 
Transparency International and collected from their website. For each company, the 
CPI of the country where it is firstly listed has been included.  
12771 63.54 17.77 34.00 92.00 
ENGLISH 
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates from the 
English Common Law system. It is reported in La Porta et al. (1998). For each 
company, the ENGLISH dummy is created of the country where it is firstly listed.  
12777 0.60 0.49 0 1 
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Table 2: IPO underpricing by country 
Country Mean StD N Min Max 
Argentina 28.53 37.63 7.00 0.38 108.19 
Australia 18.46 38.37 960.00 -50.19 402.86 
Austria 8.52 13.88 11.00 -8.57 29.17 
Belgium 7.27 10.83 48.00 -3.75 45.45 
Brazil 5.62 24.72 44.00 -19.44 153.94 
Canada 22.73 39.72 332.00 -25.64 219.32 
China 43.11 47.38 2729.00 -39.44 705.00 
Cyprus 8.86 10.95 7.00 0.47 32.84 
Denmark 7.58 15.12 15.00 -11.29 51.35 
Finland 7.10 22.33 16.00 -26.71 80.72 
France 3.43 14.32 317.00 -26.26 189.69 
Germany 24.40 109.71 87.00 -18.57 890.00 
Greece 17.52 42.94 50.00 -34.58 183.33 
Hong Kong 42.77 119.26 555.00 -35.93 880.43 
India 14.89 31.38 188.00 -29.14 213.82 
Indonesia 20.99 29.07 123.00 -24.00 169.57 
Israel 17.46 29.00 91.00 -27.50 113.33 
Italy 6.99 13.30 71.00 -5.45 84.22 
Japan 39.77 50.80 550.00 -30.56 353.55 
Luxembourg 6.57 10.18 16.00 -13.60 25.40 
Malaysia 28.65 65.34 317.00 -34.88 873.33 
Mexico 9.16 12.05 10.00 -5.45 37.86 
Netherlands 7.33 23.09 46.00 -19.50 137.19 
New Zealand 6.99 16.46 53.00 -40.99 55.70 
Norway 2.33 8.70 62.00 -23.19 40.30 
Philippines 10.16 19.51 35.00 -17.44 50.27 
Poland 22.03 32.91 31.00 -12.70 131.26 
Singapore 21.82 37.77 277.00 -25.98 208.09 
South Africa 20.61 36.62 14.00 -0.57 143.09 
Spain 4.35 8.23 13.00 -5.10 19.10 
Sweden 21.10 45.96 48.00 -45.58 230.00 
Switzerland 8.51 14.36 37.00 -22.33 45.83 
Taiwan 24.37 34.82 722.00 -24.28 233.36 
Thailand 33.16 48.51 264.00 -42.42 198.18 
Turkey 7.26 11.84 9.00 -4.66 31.03 
United Kingdom 14.10 25.23 668.00 -58.33 276.09 
United States 24.01 41.22 3955.00 -41.08 281.71 
Total 27.46 49.40 12778.00 -58.33 890.00 
This table shows the summary statistics of the IPO underpricing by country. It contains the mean and standard deviation of 
IPO underpricing for each country, and the number of observations for each country in the sample of 12,778 IPOs from 1995 
to 2017. It also presents the lowest and highest underpricing in every country during our sample period.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics of country variables 
Panel A: Measures of integration 
Country MI EG EG_df EG_dj Finance_df Finance_dj 
Argentina 0.144 42.49 37.80 47.18 57.81 49.02 
Australia 0.973 64.07 52.82 75.31 73.08 68.15 
Austria 0.901 80.14 75.46 84.81 85.74 77.89 
Belgium 0.848 79.98 80.42 79.19 84.51 75.44 
Brazil 0.380 46.18 36.45 55.91 50.14 54.25 
Canada 0.941 70.77 58.43 83.12 80.22 82.12 
China 0.052 43.98 49.23 38.74 51.22 15.61 
Cyprus 0.193 73.06 70.77 75.35 83.86 64.85 
Denmark 0.948 76.44 69.79 83.09 79.85 75.58 
Finland 0.505 75.78 67.03 84.54 81.26 77.15 
France 0.891 76.86 66.45 87.28 86.69 83.17 
Germany 0.839 78.87 73.11 84.64 84.41 78.38 
Greece 0.267 81.92 77.57 86.27 86.37 81.71 
Hong Kong 0.947 91.06 90.24 91.88 98.18 88.17 
India 0.130 56.44 53.92 58.96 54.92 50.53 
Indonesia 0.023 32.79 30.91 34.68 31.63 27.13 
Israel 0.220 69.10 56.66 81.54 69.11 77.00 
Italy 0.829 57.57 39.50 75.63 53.44 73.23 
Japan 0.993 84.14 80.59 87.82 90.38 82.53 
Luxembourg 0.295 51.89 40.39 63.32 51.82 61.96 
Malaysia 0.272 85.87 86.38 85.36 90.18 80.72 
Mexico 0.354 67.50 78.62 56.37 75.18 46.30 
Netherlands 0.891 75.23 70.02 80.43 80.22 77.03 
New Zealand 0.404 52.82 59.33 46.32 59.74 44.41 
Norway 0.594 70.93 63.23 78.62 77.28 75.70 
Philippines 0.171 60.99 59.02 62.96 62.67 48.60 
Poland 0.374 89.02 90.58 87.46 93.64 80.48 
Singapore 0.968 73.83 73.64 74.03 81.74 70.93 
South Africa 0.978 48.59 47.86 49.32 53.14 35.98 
Spain 0.736 76.05 67.50 84.60 81.68 77.03 
Sweden 0.660 56.42 59.78 53.06 54.27 42.83 
Switzerland 0.844 46.80 54.76 38.85 57.50 16.19 
Taiwan 0.170 56.09 45.54 66.65 62.37 56.62 
Thailand 0.246 51.01 42.10 59.93 44.11 47.69 
Turkey 0.150 61.15 38.47 83.82 57.77 80.55 
United Kingdom 0.850 82.91 79.00 86.82 87.75 82.30 
United States 0.947 50.94 55.06 46.82 61.44 31.32 
This table presents the mean value of different measures of the integration for each country across the 1995-2017 sample 
period. The variable of interest is MI which measures the actual market integration and is constructed following 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). The other five measures are constructed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute. EG is the 
overall economic globalization which takes the average of the de-facto (EG_df) and de-jure (EG_dj) economic globalization 
measures. We also include two sub-indices, one de-facto (Finance_df) and one de-jure (Finance_dj), that are used in the 
construction of EG to capture the financial market integration.  
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Panel B: Country institutional variables 
Country IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
Argentina 5.80 0.00 0.50 34.00 0 
Australia 5.70 0.50 0.80 80.00 1 
Austria 6.30 1.00 0.82 72.00 0 
Belgium 6.20 0.50 0.76 76.00 0 
Brazil 6.30 0.50 0.54 43.00 0 
Canada 7.30 1.00 0.78 81.00 1 
China 4.50 0.00 0.45 36.00 0 
Cyprus 6.80 / / / 0 
Denmark 6.80 0.75 0.88 92.00 0 
Finland 5.60 0.00 0.84 89.00 0 
France 6.80 0.50 0.74 69.00 0 
Germany 5.90 1.00 0.80 79.00 0 
Greece 5.80 0.50 0.59 43.00 0 
Hong Kong 8.10 0.00 0.76 74.00 1 
India 7.30 0.50 0.48 38.00 1 
Indonesia 6.10 0.00 0.52 34.00 0 
Israel 7.10 1.00 / 60.00 1 
Italy 6.70 0.00 0.63 43.00 0 
Japan 6.30 0.00 0.78 76.00 0 
Luxembourg 4.70 1.00 / 82.00 0 
Malaysia 7.40 1.00 0.58 52.00 1 
Mexico 5.80 0.50 0.45 35.00 0 
Netherlands 5.20 0.00 0.83 83.00 0 
New Zealand 8.20 0.00 0.83 91.00 1 
Norway 7.00 1.00 0.88 86.00 0 
Philippines 4.20 0.00 0.50 38.00 0 
Poland 6.30 1.00 0.67 61.00 0 
Singapore 8.00 1.00 0.79 84.00 1 
South Africa 6.80 0.00 0.55 44.00 1 
Spain 6.40 1.00 0.67 60.00 0 
Sweden 6.30 1.00 0.85 87.00 0 
Switzerland 5.50 0.75 / 86.00 0 
Taiwan 6.40 0.00 / 61.00 0 
Thailand 6.60 0.00 0.52 38.00 1 
Turkey 6.90 0.00 0.50 45.00 0 
United Kingdom 7.80 0.00 0.78 78.00 1 
United States 6.60 0.00 0.71 74.00 1 
Mean 6.35 0.43 0.66 61.71 0.31 
This table presents each country’s institutional variables. All the variables are held constant for each country throughout the 
sample period from 1995 to 2017. Investor Protection Index (IPI) measures the level of the legal protection of minority 
investors in one country, with higher values representing better protection. Public Enforcement Index (PEI) measures the 
effectiveness of the legal enforcement, with higher values representing more effective legal enforcement. Rule of Law Index 
(RLI) measures the overall quality of the legal framework, with higher values representing better legal system. Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) measures the level of the overall corruption, with 0 representing the most corrupted system. 
ENGLISH is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates from the English Common Law. 
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Table 4: Direct effect of market integration on IPO underpricing (HLM) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MI EG_df EG_dj FG_df FG_dj 
VB 4.459*** 6.041*** 6.215*** 6.286*** 6.215*** 
 1.113 1.105 1.104 1.101 1.101 
BB -9.014*** -19.65*** -16.89*** -19.18*** -16.11*** 
 1.415 1.636 1.621 1.611 1.621 
LSIZE -3.670*** -2.333*** -2.652*** -2.372*** -2.853*** 
 0.357 0.355 0.358 0.354 0.358 
VOLUME -0.480*** -0.412*** -0.440*** -0.473*** -0.349*** 
 0.075 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 
MRETURN 0.395*** 0.406*** 0.433*** 0.428*** 0.448*** 
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
TURNOVER -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.014*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNDERWRITER 1.715*** 1.783*** 1.955*** 1.928*** 2.015*** 
 0.219 0.210 0.211 0.210 0.210 
INTEGRATION -0.358*** -0.331*** -0.496*** -0.448*** -0.494*** 
 0.024 0.052 0.063 0.045 0.047 
Constant 65.59*** 64.44*** 82.97*** 75.18*** 79.37*** 
 3.682 4.241 5.776 4.153 4.593 
var(c.country) 187.0*** 101.7*** 136.2*** 88.72*** 145.3*** 
 52.56 29.67 39.87 27.44 42.38 
var(e.ir) 2,144*** 1,681*** 1,675*** 1,671*** 1,665*** 
 28.97 26.26 26.16 26.09 26.00 
Observations 10,991 8,228 8,228 8,228 8,228 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017, by multi-level modelling. IPO 
underpricing is firstly modelled at firm level and then at country level. A random intercept model is assumed with the 
intercept shifting between countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results using different 
measures of integration (INTEGRATION). The baseline model is Model (1) which uses a de facto measure of stock market 
integration (MI). MI is the R-squared of the regression of a country’s daily market performance in a given year on the global 
factors, a method developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Model (1) uses a sample of 10,991 observations from 37 
countries. For the efficiency of the calculation, we choose countries which have a minimum number of IPOs equal or larger 
than 6. Models (2) to (5) use alternative measures of globalization and integration that are constructed by the KOF Swiss 
Economic Institute. Model (2) adopts a de facto measure of economic globalization (EG_df) which captures both the 
exchange of trade, capital flows and stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. Model (3) adopts a de jure measure of economic 
globalization (EG_dj) which focuses on policies on trade and capital flows. Models (4) and (5) adopt financial integration 
measures which are closer to our market integration measure. Finance_df is the de facto measure which is the sum of 
external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, a method firstly developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and revised 
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Finance_dj measures the country’s capital account openness based on its restrictions on 
the cross-border financial transactions, a measure developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). The dependent variable is 
Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a 
percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a 
dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, 
expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country 
divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative 
market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value 
recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. 
UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s reputation which is measured by the IPO market share of this underwriter during the 
1995-2017 sample period. var(c.country) is the variance between countries and var(e.ir) is the variance between individual 
IPOs. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, 
**, and *** respectively. 
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Table 5: Direct effect of market integration on IPO underpricing (OLS) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 MI EG_df EG_dj FG_df FG_dj 
VB 9.356*** 7.551*** 9.883*** 7.212*** 10.14*** 
 0.959 1.069 1.068 1.063 1.066 
BB -1.632 -16.77*** -4.636*** -17.89*** -3.261*** 
 1.352 1.528 1.267 1.433 1.255 
LSIZE -2.271*** -0.381 -1.829*** -1.357*** -2.039*** 
 0.305 0.332 0.339 0.331 0.337 
VOLUME -0.536*** -0.578*** -0.540*** -0.534*** -0.467*** 
 0.058 0.091 0.088 0.090 0.087 
MRETURN 0.425*** 0.488*** 0.498*** 0.473*** 0.504*** 
 0.051 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.055 
TURNOVER -0.002*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.003*** -0.005*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNDERWRITER 1.141*** 0.677*** 1.650*** 1.273*** 1.733*** 
 0.223 0.247 0.255 0.248 0.255 
INTEGRATION -0.235*** -0.430*** -0.548*** -0.658*** -0.425*** 
 0.013 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.022 
Constant 54.01*** 64.04*** 78.48*** 84.09*** 66.05*** 
 1.926 2.998 3.304 3.269 2.635 
Observations 10,991 8,228 8,228 8,228 8,228 
R-squared 0.045 0.056 0.079 0.092 0.084 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017.  Models (1) to (5) present the 
results using different measures of integration (INTEGRATION). Model (1) which uses our variable of interest which is a de 
facto measurement of stock market integration (MI). MI is the R-squared of the regression of a country’s daily market 
performance in a given year on the global factors, a method developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Model (1) uses a 
sample of 10,991 observations from 37 countries. For the efficiency of the calculation, we choose countries which have a 
minimum number of IPOs equal or larger than 6. Models (2) to (5) use alternative measures of globalization and financial 
market integration that are constructed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute. Model (2) adopts a de facto measure of 
economic globalization (EG_df) which captures both the exchange of trade, capital flows and stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities. Model (3) adopts a de jure measure of economic globalization (EG_dj) which focuses on policies on trade and 
capital flows. Models (4) and (5) adopt financial integration measures which are closer to our market integration measure. 
Finance_df is the de facto measure which is the sum of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, a method firstly 
developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and revised in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Finance_dj measures the 
country’s capital account openness based on its restrictions on the cross-border financial transactions, a measure developed 
by Chinn and Ito (2006). The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and 
equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an 
issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is 
the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this 
country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in 
DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded 
divided by the average market capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s reputation which is measured by the IPO 
market share of this underwriter during the 1995-2017 sample period. The figures below each coefficient are the standard 
errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 6 Propensity score matching results (Logit Model) 
Outcome variable: 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
H_MI H_EG_df H_EG_dj H_Finance_df H_Finance_dj 
      
ATE -10.34*** -16.75*** -10.65*** -11.22*** -12.64*** 
 1.25 1.221 1.662 1.528 1.148 
Obs (High 
Integration Group) 7784 7488 8424 8572 6884 
Obs (Low 
Integration Group) 3381 3677 2741 2593 4281 
This table presents the results on the treatment effect regression with propensity score matching (PSM). H_MI is a dummy 
variable which groups the IPOs into high- and low-integration countries. It equals 1 if the IPO is listed in a country that has a 
level of market integration (MI) above the average in the issuance year and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create H_EG_df, 
H_EG_dj, H_Finance_df and H_Finance_dj dummies based on the alternative measures of integration used in Table 4. 
Models (1) to (5) represent PSM estimations using these five dummy variables separately. ATE is the estimate average 
treatment effect (being in the high-integration countries) on IPO underpricing. Each observation in the high-integration 
group is matched to a single subject in the low-integration group whose propensity score is closet. The propensity score is 
obtained by using a logit model on VB, BB, LSIZE, VOLUME, MRETURN, TURNOVER and UNDERWRITER. VB captures 
the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and 
equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed as a logarithm. 
VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total 
number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before 
the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in 
DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the 
underwriter’s reputation, which is measured by the IPO market share of this underwriter during the 1995-2017 sample period. 
The statistics shown under each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with 
*, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 7: Indirect effect of market integration on IPO underpricing 
Dependent Variable: 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
VB 4.216*** 4.201*** 4.309*** 4.359*** 4.407*** 
 1.113 1.112 1.141 1.113 1.114 
BB -9.023*** -9.374*** -10.93*** -8.595*** -9.132*** 
 1.407 1.438 1.587 1.425 1.414 
LSIZE -3.860*** -3.732*** -3.754*** -3.726*** -3.734*** 
 0.355 0.356 0.37 0.357 0.357 
VOLUME -0.440*** -0.460*** -0.421*** -0.465*** -0.450*** 
 0.075 0.076 0.078 0.076 0.076 
MRETURN 0.401*** 0.397*** 0.406*** 0.395*** 0.397*** 
 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.045 0.045 
TURNOVER -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNDERWRITER 1.776*** 1.762*** 1.778*** 1.730*** 1.720*** 
 0.219 0.219 0.224 0.219 0.219 
MI -1.467*** -0.391*** -1.154*** -0.936*** -0.430*** 
 0.200 0.026 0.321 0.204 0.059 
Institution -16.71*** -51.96*** -88.84*** -0.580*** -22.94*** 
 2.080 8.301 27.400 0.175 6.209 
MI x Institution 0.206*** 0.522*** 1.380*** 0.0103*** 0.282*** 
 0.032 0.096 0.487 0.003 0.089 
Constant 158.4*** 73.74*** 112.9*** 92.33*** 71.29*** 
 12.23 4.001 14.60 8.650 4.162 
var(c.country) 102.4*** 204.7*** 154.5*** 166.2*** 171.7*** 
 32.66 60.12 45.96 47.83 49.98 
var(e.ir) 2,136*** 2,135*** 2,200*** 2,142*** 2,142*** 
 28.85 28.85 30.64 28.94 28.94 
Observations 10,991 10,991 10,337 10,991 10,991 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017 by multi-level modelling. IPO 
underpricing is firstly modelled at firm level and then at country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept 
shifts between countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different 
country-level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between 
the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status 
of the IPO firm and equal to 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if the IPO uses 
book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in a logarithm. VOLUME, for each 
country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs 
throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on 
the country market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the 
value of the shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s reputation 
which is measured by the IPO market share of this underwriter during 1995-2017. Market integration (MI) is the R-squared 
of the regression of a country’s daily market performance in a given year on the global factors, a method developed by 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Institution represents each of the five country-level institutional variables from Models (1) 
to (5). IPI is the Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of legal protection of minority investors in one country; 
it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the Public Enforcement Index, which 
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measures the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher 
values representing more effective legal enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, which measures the overall quality of 
the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing a better legal system. CPI is the Corruption 
Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing the most 
corrupted system. ENGLISH is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates from the English 
Common Law and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest here is MI x Institution, which is the interaction term between each 
of these institutional variables and MI, i.e. MI x Institution in Model (1) is equal to MI * IPI. var(c.country) is the variance 
between countries and var(e.ir) is the variance between individual IPOs. The figures below each coefficient are the standard 
errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness – Constant low/high value of market integration 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
MI_Low -1.467***  -0.391***  -1.154***  -0.936***  
 -0.200  -0.026  -0.321  -0.204  
MI_High  -1.467***  -0.391***  -1.154***  -0.936*** 
  -0.200  -0.026  -0.321  -0.204 
Institution -10.44*** -5.154*** -36.10*** 3.379 -46.87** 57.56 -0.266** 0.516** 
 1.359 1.945 5.675 3.760 19.28 36.43 0.129 0.245 
Interaction_Low 0.206***  0.522***  1.380***  0.0103***  
 0.032  0.096  0.487  0.003  
Interaction_High  0.206***  0.522***  1.380***  0.0103*** 
  0.032  0.096  0.487  0.003 
Constant 113.8*** 2.733 61.87*** 32.31*** 77.83*** -9.503 63.86*** -7.005 
 8.298 13.76 3.661 3.487 11.38 -27.38 7.495 -18.55 
var(c.country) 102.4*** 102.4*** 204.7*** 204.7*** 154.5*** 154.5*** 166.2*** 166.2*** 
 32.66 32.66 60.12 60.12 45.96 45.96 47.83 47.83 
var(e.ir) 2,136*** 2,136*** 2,135*** 2,135*** 2,200*** 2,200*** 2,142*** 2,142*** 
 28.85 28.85 28.85 28.85 30.64 30.64 28.94 28.94 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,991 10,991 10,991 10,991 10,337 10,337 10,991 10,991 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017, by multi-level modelling, when the moderator variable—market integration (MI)—is held constant at low 
and high values for each institutional variable. IPO underpricing is firstly modelled at firm level and then at country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept shifts between 
countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (4) present the results including four continuous country-level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is 
Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. While results are not reported here, control variables are 
also included: VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an 
issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the 
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total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. 
TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s 
reputation which is measured by the IPO market share of this underwriter during the 1995-2017 sample period. Under each model, there are two models – (a) and (b) - where MI is held constant 
at low (MI_Low) and high (MI _High) values. MI_Low is the market integration held constant at 1 standard deviation below the mean, and MI_High is the market integration held constant at 1 
standard deviation above the mean. Market integration (MI) is the R-squared of the regression of a country’s daily market performance in a given year on global factors, a method developed by 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Institution represents each of the four country-level institutional variables from Models (1) to (4). IPI is the Investor Protection Index, which measures the level 
of the legal protection of minority investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the Public Enforcement Index, which measures the 
effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more effective legal enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, 
which measures the overall quality of the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing better legal system. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index, which measures 
the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing the most corrupted system. Interaction_Low and Interaction_High are the interaction term between each 
institutional variable and respectively MI_Low and MI_High; i.e. Interaction_Low in Model (1a) is equal to MI_Low * IPI. var(c.country) is the variance between countries and var(e.ir) is the 
variance between individual IPOs. The statistics shown under each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively.  
  
42  
Table 9: Robustness – Indirect effect with alternative measure of integration 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
VB 5.908*** 6.104*** 6.021*** 6.100*** 5.962*** 
 1.101 1.102 1.103 1.1 1.1 
BB -16.92*** -19.74*** -16.80*** -16.67*** -16.68*** 
 1.619 1.640 1.634 1.637 1.625 
LSIZE -2.795*** -2.554*** -2.812*** -2.766*** -2.768*** 
 0.356 0.354 0.357 0.357 0.356 
VOLUME -0.480*** -0.420*** -0.502*** -0.517*** -0.501*** 
 0.091 0.092 0.093 0.092 0.092 
MRETURN 0.435*** 0.421*** 0.435*** 0.434*** 0.437*** 
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
TURNOVER -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNDERWRITER 2.071*** 1.928*** 2.094*** 2.096*** 2.073*** 
 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.211 0.211 
EG -2.399*** -0.784*** -1.264** -1.394*** -0.874*** 
 0.431 0.097 0.589 0.393 0.120 
Institution -33.56*** -94.26*** -284.1*** -1.977*** -79.72*** 
 4.341 16.81 42.26 0.304 11.63 
EG x Institution 0.374*** 1.200*** 2.403*** 0.022*** 1.020*** 
 0.064 0.224 0.767 0.005 0.177 
Constant 262.1*** 100.5*** 215.6*** 171.5*** 111.9*** 
 26.54 6.791 28.10 20.02 8.053 
var(c.country) 106.5*** 78.34*** 230.8*** 193.1*** 108.8*** 
 35.95 26.41 73.23 59.58 36.10 
var(e.ir) 1,660*** 1,671*** 1,660*** 1,660*** 1,663*** 
 25.94 26.1 25.98 25.94 25.98 
Observations 8,228 8,228 8,206 8,228 8,228 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017, by multi-level modelling, when the 
volume-based market integration is replaced with the mixed measure—Economic Globalization (EG). IPO underpricing is 
firstly modelled at firm level and then at country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept shifts between 
countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different country-level 
institutional variables respectively. Economic Globalization (EG) is the overall economic globalization which takes the 
average of the de-facto and de-jure economic globalization measures by KOF Swiss Economic Institute. The dependent 
variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, 
expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-
backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size 
of the IPO, expressed in a logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in 
one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month 
cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock 
turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the average market 
capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s reputation which is measured by the IPO market share of this 
underwriter during the 1995-2017 sample period. Institution represents each of the five country-level institutional variables 
from Models (1) to (5). IPI is the Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of the legal protection of minority 
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investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the Public 
Enforcement Index, which measures the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges 
from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more effective legal enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, which measures 
the overall quality of the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing a better legal system. CPI 
is the Corruption Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 
representing the most corrupted system. ENGLISH is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s legal system 
originates from English Common Law; 0 otherwise. The variable of interest here is EG X Institution, which is the interaction 
term between each of these institutional variables and EG. i.e. EG X Institution in Model (1) is equal to IPI*EG. 
var(c.country) is the variance between countries and var(e.ir) is the variance between individual IPOs. The figures below 
each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is marked with *, **, and *** respectively.  
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Table 10: Robusntess – Interaction with mean-centred variables 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cen_IPI Cen_PEI Cen_RLI Cen_CPI Cen_ENGLISH 
VB 4.216*** 4.201*** 4.309*** 4.359*** 4.407*** 
 1.113 1.112 1.141 1.113 1.114 
BB -9.023*** -9.374*** -10.93*** -8.595*** -9.132*** 
 1.407 1.438 1.587 1.425 1.414 
LSIZE -3.860*** -3.732*** -3.754*** -3.726*** -3.734*** 
 0.355 0.356 0.370 0.357 0.357 
VOLUME -0.440*** -0.460*** -0.421*** -0.465*** -0.450*** 
 0.075 0.076 0.078 0.076 0.076 
MRETURN 0.401*** 0.397*** 0.406*** 0.395*** 0.397*** 
 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.045 0.045 
TURNOVER -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNDERWRITER 1.776*** 1.762*** 1.778*** 1.730*** 1.720*** 
 0.219 0.219 0.224 0.219 0.219 
Cen_MI -0.144*** -0.308*** -0.219*** -0.256*** -0.430*** 
 0.040 0.025 0.064 0.057 0.059 
Cen_Institution -2.645** -16.36*** 5.343 0.125 -3.712 
 1.170 3.179 22.600 0.156 3.513 
Cen_MI x 
Cen_Institution 0.206*** 0.522*** 1.380*** 0.010*** 0.282*** 
 0.032 0.096 0.487 0.003 0.089 
Constant 41.27*** 44.52*** 37.78*** 36.67*** 41.92*** 
 2.719 3.298 3.607 3.385 3.698 
var(c.country) 102.4*** 204.7*** 154.5*** 166.2*** 171.7*** 
 32.66 60.12 45.96 47.83 49.98 
var(e.ir) 2,136*** 2,135*** 2,200*** 2,142*** 2,142*** 
 28.85 28.85 30.64 28.94 28.94 
Observations 10,991 10,991 10,337 10,991 10,991 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2017, by multi-level modelling, when the 
market integration (MI) and institutional variables are mean-centred before interacting them. IPO underpricing is firstly 
modelled at firm level and then at country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept shifts between 
countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different mean-centred 
country-level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between 
the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status 
of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-
building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year 
companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the 
sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country 
market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the 
shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. UNDERWRITER is the underwriter’s reputation which is 
measured by the IPO market share of this underwriter during the 1995-2017 sample period. Cen_MI is the mean-centred 
market integration (MI) which is the R-squared of the regression of a country’s daily market performance in a given year on 
  
45  
global factors, a method developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Institution represents each of the five mean-centred 
country-level institutional variables from Models (1) to (5). Cen_IPI is the mean-centred Investor Protection Index, which 
measures the level of the legal protection of minority investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values 
representing better protection. Cen_PEI is the mean-centred Public Enforcement Index which measures the effectiveness of 
one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more effective 
legal enforcement. Cen_RLI is the mean-centred Rule of Law Index, which measures the overall quality of the legal 
framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing better legal system. Cen_CPI is the mean-centred 
Corruption Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing 
the most corrupted system Cen_ENGLISH is the mean-centred dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s legal system 
originates from the English Common Law and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest here is Cen_MI x Cen_Institution, which 
is the interaction term between each of the mean-centred institutional variables and the mean-centred MI. i.e. Cen_MI x 
Cen_Institution in Model (1) is equal to Cen_IPI* Cen_MI. var(c.country) is the variance between countries and var(e.ir) is 
the variance between individual IPOs. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels is marked with *, **, and *** respectively.  
 
